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subprime. What I am calling the non-prime market
covers subprime and Alt-A. There are, of course,
a variety of non-prime markets, in auto loans and
elsewhere. To streamline the exposition, I will
drop the modifier “mortgage,” and you can assume
I am discussing the mortgage market unless I make
specific mention of some other market.
Some of the problems we’re seeing in the
non-prime market may have been inevitable given
the breakneck innovation and growth of recent
years, followed by a significant cooling of housing-
market activity. Yet it is important that we learn
the correct lessons from these problems. In a future
housing-market slowdown, we want to avoid
repetition of recent problems. We also want to
preserve appropriate access to credit by those
with impaired credit standing. The subprime
market in particular is an immature market—a
baby market in age, though not in size—and we
want to remember the adage about not discarding
the baby with the bathwater.
My premise today is that a lasting improve-
ment in the functioning of the non-prime market
is most likely if we correct the fundamental prob-
lems that seem to be causing the greatest difficul-
ties, rather than attacking mere symptoms of the
problem. To preview my conclusion briefly, I
believe the fundamental problems in the non-
prime mortgage market amenable to improvement
stem from inadequate incentives among some of
the parties operating in the market to create and
maintain strong reputations for quality and fair-
dealing. A solid reputation is a valuable asset for
the individual firm, for the economy and society
M
y topic this morning is the non-
prime mortgage market, which
has been in the news on almost a
daily basis. Non-prime mortgages
are the common denominator in such diverse
recent developments as rising household fore-
closure rates and collapsing hedge funds. You
also may have read some of the news coverage
of Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s
testimony on this topic before Congress earlier
this week (Bernanke, 2007a).
Developments in the non-prime mortgage
market matter to the Federal Reserve for three
main reasons. First, the non-prime mortgage
market—with 2006 originations of about one
trillion dollars1—clearly is large enough to affect
aggregate homebuilding activity and consumer
spending. Second, the Fed also supervises some
banks and most financially oriented holding com-
panies; consistent with those responsibilities, the
Fed is monitoring the performance of non-prime
mortgage loans carefully for signs of further credit
deterioration. Congress has granted the Federal
Reserve the authority to define unfair and decep-
tive acts and practices under several important
federal consumer-protection statutes. We take this
responsibility seriously, and we are gathering
information now to determine what else we should
do to modify disclosure and other regulations.
Most of the news, and most of the problems,
relate to the highest risk part of the non-prime
mortgage market—the subprime market. There
have also been some problems in the so-called
“Alt-A” market, which lies between prime and
1 Non-prime mortgage originations during 2006 consisted of approximately $600 billion of subprime and about $400 billion of Alt-A mortgages.
These terms are defined below.as a whole. This point is not a new one. “My word
is my bond” has been the motto of the London
Stock Exchange since 1801.
Every long-lived business depends on trust
in the marketplace. The firm benefits from a
durable business franchise, which is why build-
ing trust is important to the firm. The economy
is more efficient because market disciplines will
tend to reduce shortsighted, opportunistic and
ultimately wasteful business practices. A better-
functioning market will require lenders who are
better informed about borrowers’ capacity to serv-
ice debt and borrowers who are better informed
about the commitments they are making. When
lenders and borrowers alike understand their
commitments and risks, sub-optimal outcomes
such as mortgage write-downs and foreclosures
are less likely. Society benefits from a more effi-
cient use of its scarce resources.
I’ll begin by describing the current non-prime
market and providing some basic background on
the sector. Next comes a discussion of the role of
mortgage brokers and realtors and the reputations
they establish. I’ll finish with a few comments on
the Federal Reserve’s oversight role in the non-
prime market, including a summary of what ini-
tiatives and actions we’re undertaking.
Before proceeding, I want to emphasize that
the views I express here are mine and do not
necessarily reflect official positions of the Federal
Reserve System. I thank my colleagues at the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for their com-
ments. William R. Emmons, senior economist in
the Banking Supervision and Regulation Division,
and Rajdeep Sengupta, economist in the Research
Division, provided special assistance. I retain
full responsibility for errors.
THE NON-PRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET: SUBPRIME AND ALT-A
SECTORS
Market convention is evolving toward a dif-
ferentiation between prime and non-prime mort-
gages, and further to subprime and Alt-A sectors
of the non-prime market. Analysts face problems
in gathering accurate information about the non-
prime mortgage markets. I won’t dwell on those
here, but my text, which is available on the St.
Louis Fed web site, describes these difficulties
in greater detail.
According to the federal banking and thrift
regulatory agencies, subprime mortgages are
those made to borrowers who display, among
other characteristics, (i) a previous record of
delinquency, foreclosure or bankruptcy, (ii) a low
credit score, and/or (iii) a ratio of debt service to
income of 50 percent or greater (Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency, et al., 2007). An
Alt-A mortgage—short for “alternative-A” and
also known as “A minus”—is one made to a bor-
rower who might be of prime credit quality but
who does not qualify for a prime loan because
there is something missing or irregular in the loan
application. The borrower’s credit record may be
incomplete or slightly impaired, or the borrower
may be purchasing the property as an investment
rather than to live in it (Chomsisengphet and
Pennington-Cross, 2006). An application file is
deemed incomplete when it is missing certain
information, as, for example, when the borrower
is unwilling or unable to document income or
assets to the lender’s satisfaction. An irregular
application might be one where the borrower
does not have a large enough downpayment to
satisfy the lender’s standard underwriting crite-
ria for prime credit. Alternatively, the borrower’s
credit history may be short, perhaps because the
borrower is young. Thus, the non-prime mortgage
sector consists of mortgages that entail a borrow-
ing household with a B, C or D credit grade, a
non-standard or incomplete loan application or
credit history, or all of these.
Non-prime mortgages carry interest rates
notably higher than those on prime mortgages.
For a non-prime fixed-rate mortgage (FRM), the
spread over a prime FRM could be several per-
centage points, depending on the borrower and
the loan. For a non-prime adjustable-rate mortgage
(ARM), the initial rate could be one-half to one
percentage point above a comparable prime ARM
initial interest rate, while the fully implemented
margin of a non-prime ARM could be two or
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on a prime ARM, itself likely to be as much as
three percentage points.2
Higher rates are one, but not the only, impor-
tant distinguishing characteristic of non-prime
loans. High rates are necessary for lenders to make
an adequate return on investment when facing
relatively high underwriting costs and prospec-
tively high delinquency and default rates. Charg-
ing high rates, therefore, reflects cost- and
risk-based pricing and can be perfectly consistent
with competitive markets. It is important to under-
stand that high rates on non-prime mortgages do
not, per se, indicate either a lack of competition
or predatory behavior by lenders.
There are several other notable differences
between prime and non-prime loans. Prime mort-
gages are more likely to include a fixed interest
rate for the life of the loan as well as automatic
funding of, and disbursement from, an escrow
account used to pay the homeowner’s taxes and
insurance obligations. During most periods, a
larger fraction of prime mortgage loans are for
home purchase than for refinancing, in contrast
to the non-prime sector, where refinancing is a
more common loan purpose. Non-prime loans
typically charge higher up-front fees, are more
likely to include prepayment penalties, may
accept limited or no documentation of the bor-
rower’s income or assets, and may be used by
investors rather than by owner-occupiers. Some
of these practices in the non-prime market have
been responsible for high default rates and it is no
doubt true that lenders are much more cautious
today than a few years ago in accepting limited
documentation.
Another distinguishing feature of the non-
prime sector is product innovation. In contrast
to the traditional 30-year, fixed-rate, amortizing
mortgage that dominates the prime sector, the sub-
prime and Alt-A sectors include a wide variety
of adjustable and hybrid interest-rate structures,
together with a range of principal-amortization
options.3 Of particular note is the recent popular-
ity of so-called “negatively amortizing” mortgages,
such as the “pay-option ARM.” The federal bank-
ing and thrift supervisory agencies issued guid-
ance in 2006 that described these complex
mortgages and provided direction to supervisors
and lenders on how best to offer and manage
these loans (Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, et al., 2006).
EVOLUTION OF THE NON-PRIME
MORTGAGE MARKET
In the prime mortgage market, securitization
began around 1970. Packaging mortgages into
securities was an important innovation, as it per-
mitted development of a secondary market in
mortgages and allowed banks and other mortgage
originators to control portfolio risk by selling
mortgages into the capital market. In the non-
prime market, securitization began in earnest only
in the mid-1990s. In part because securitization
expertise and distribution networks existed
already for prime mortgages, the growth of non-
prime securitization has been even more rapid
than early developments in the prime sector. It
took about 35 years for three quarters of prime
mortgage originations to be securitized, but a
comparable share may be reached in half the
time in the non-prime market (Chomsisengphet
and Pennington-Cross, 2006).
Along with an increased volume of credit-
related information about households and
improvements in credit-risk analysis by lenders,
securitization probably is the key factor that sup-
ported the burgeoning growth of the non-prime
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2 An ARM margin is the amount by which the borrower’s interest rate exceeds the index rate, such as one-year LIBOR.
3 A so-called hybrid mortgage commences with a fixed rate for a few years and then converts to an adjustable rate for the duration of the mortgage
term. For example, a 2/28 hybrid has a fixed rate for two years, after which the rate begins to adjust every six or 12 months with reference to
an index rate, such as six-month LIBOR or the one-year Treasury yield. A subprime 2/28 mortgage might carry a 550 basis-point margin, which
means that, after the initial two-year “teaser” rate has expired, the fully indexed mortgage rate will be the index rate plus 550 basis points.
There may be contractual limits on how quickly the mortgage rate may adjust toward the fully indexed rate, as well as limits on how much
the mortgage rate may change during the life of the loan.mortgage market since the mid-1990s. By opening
local non-prime mortgage markets to national
and global capital markets, the flow of capital to
the sector surged as never before. Rising house
prices also played an important role, as borrowers
and lenders came to expect healthy gains in the
equity that borrowers had in their houses, sup-
porting more aggressive loan-to-value ratios in
underwriting both first- and second-lien mort-
gages. Finally, household incomes have grown
relatively rapidly in comparison to the cost of
borrowing—especially during the early part of
this decade, when economic recovery preceded
the gradual upward movement of market interest
rates.
One aspect of recent developments was odd
and has turned out to be the source of much dif-
ficulty in the non-prime market. The steep yield
curve during much of the 2002-04 period reflected
investor expectations that short-term interest rates
would be rising, which they in fact did. Yet, many
mortgage-market participants apparently did not
anticipate this increase. Of course, I would not
expect average homeowners to be able to read
the yield curve, but I find it odd that apparently
sophisticated investors in non-prime mortgage-
backed securities now claim surprise that many
non-prime ARM borrowers are facing payment
shock because of the increase in short-term interest
rates over the past few years. Apparently driven
by the prospects of high fee income and substan-
tial spreads on non-prime ARMs, mortgage origi-
nators persuaded many relatively unsophisticated
borrowers to take out these mortgages; then,
investors willingly purchased them when they
were securitized. Many of these mortgages are
now in default, some of the lenders are bankrupt,
and the mortgage-backed securities are trading at
deep discounts to face value.
It is important to emphasize that what is odd
is not that there was a risk of rising short-term
interest rates, as there always is, but that the mar-
ket clearly expected an increase, as indicated by
the shape of the yield curve. This expectation, in
turn, was encouraged by the Fed’s Open Market
Committee. The policy statement issued at the
conclusion of the FOMC meeting of May 4, 2004,
said that “the Committee believes that policy
accommodation can be removed at a pace that is
likely to be measured.” A similar phrase appeared
in subsequent FOMC policy statements until
December 2005, when the language was changed
slightly to “the Committee judges that some further
measured policy firming is likely to be needed.”
At its next meeting, in January 2006, the language
changed from “is likely to be needed” to “may
be needed,” and somewhat similar language
remained in the policy statement through the
FOMC meeting in January 2007.
Given these widely held expectations of rising
interest rates, it is difficult to avoid the judgment
that these ARM loans were poorly underwritten
at the outset. It was imprudent for mortgage bro-
kers and lenders to approve borrowers who likely
could not service the loans when rates rose, and
it is surprising to me that sophisticated capital-
market investors willingly purchased securities
backed by such poorly underwritten mortgages.
As a number of observers have emphasized,
rapid growth of the non-prime sector has broad-
ened access to mortgage credit in recent years.
The Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer
Finances provides data on the percentage of fam-
ilies that had some mortgage debt on a primary
residence at three-year intervals between 1989
and 2004. Between 1989 and 1995, there was little
change in the fraction of families that had a first
mortgage in any income group, except for the
income group representing the 20 percent of fam-
ilies with the lowest incomes, where the fraction
of families with mortgages rose from 7.6 percent
to 10.4 percent. Gains for these families continued
after 1995, with the fraction of those with mort-
gages rising to 15.9 percent in 2004. Thus, in a
period of only 15 years, from 1989 to 2004, the
percentage of families in the lowest income quin-
tile that had mortgages more than doubled.
Between 1995 and 2004, the fraction of fami-
lies with a mortgage on a primary residence
increased notably in all income groups. The
largest increases were among families below the
highest income quintile, suggesting that access
to mortgage credit may have increased most for
families that were in the middle and lower parts
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quintile—those families with incomes between
the 40th and the 60th percentiles of the income
distribution—is particularly striking. After essen-
tially no increase in the incidence of first mort-
gages between 1989 and 1995, the fraction
increased 13.5 percentage points between 1995
and 2004. This period coincides with the most
rapid growth of the non-prime mortgage market,
and it is likely that families in lower and middle-
income groups were among those receiving non-
prime mortgages. Table 1 provides more complete
data.
The data just discussed cover all mortgages.
Comprehensive, long-term data are not readily
available on the share of the non-prime mortgage
sector in the total market or its composition. One
reason for the lack of good data on the non-prime
market is that the terms in common use today—
subprime and Alt-A, or borrower grades B, C and
D—are not defined precisely or consistently
across lenders or across time. Another reason for
the lack of a good historical database is that what
we now call the non-prime sector was quite small
until recently, and thus was easily overlooked.
Yet another important reason for the paucity of
good data is that these types of mortgages were,
until recently, not even offered by depository
institutions (banks, thrifts or credit unions) or
purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the
federally chartered mortgage institutions. Instead,
a myriad of smaller and specialized non-
depository lenders pioneered the subprime and
Alt-A sectors, and regulatory agencies did not
require these firms to collect and report data to
the same extent as their federally regulated
depository-institution counterparts.
Given these disclaimers about the limits of
our knowledge, we do know that the total amount
of home mortgages outstanding at the end of
March 2007 was about $10.4 trillion. It appears
that as much as $1.3 trillion of subprime mortgages
was outstanding at that time, along with about
the same amount of Alt-A mortgages (although
different data sources provide somewhat differ-
ent estimates of this sector). Thus, the subprime
and Alt-A segments each represent 13 or 14 per-
cent of the overall mortgage market. These sectors
together accounted for only about 10 percent of
mortgage originations in 1995 (Chomsisengphet
and Pennington-Cross, 2006).
The jumbo sector—comprising mortgages
larger than the maximum loan size eligible for
purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—con-
sisted of perhaps $2.5 trillion in March 2007,
while prime, conventional, conforming mortgages
comprised the remaining $5 trillion.4 In terms of
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Table 1
Incidence of Mortgage Debt on Primary Residence
Family income quintile
Percent of families that had some IV All
mortgage debt on a primary residence Lowest II III IV Highest families
1989 7.6 23.4 37.8 56.4 72.1 39.5
1995 10.4 25.9 38.2 59.1 71.4 41.0
2004 15.9 29.5 51.7 65.8 76.5 47.9
Change, 1989-1995 +2.8 +2.5 +0.4 +2.7 –0.8 +1.5
Change, 1995-2004 +5.5 +3.6 +13.5 +6.7 +5.1 +6.9
SOURCE: Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
4 The market shares I cite were estimated by a prominent Wall Street investment firm, while other sources provide somewhat different market
shares. The precise numbers are not important for my purposes today.the number of subprime borrowers, there are
about 7.5 million first-lien subprime mortgages
outstanding (Bernanke, 2007c), out of a total of
more than 50 million first mortgages.
Despite the heterogeneity in the non-prime
market, the bottom line is that more people have
access to mortgage credit now than ever before.
The non-prime market has become very large; it
is evolving constantly, and yet remains relatively
opaque. Despite its limitations and flaws, the
non-prime market has served a large number of
borrowers very well.
BROKERS AND REALTORS IN
THE NON-PRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET
One of the key features of the U.S. mortgage
market is the large role played by independent
mortgage brokers. Mortgage brokers are licensed
and supervised by state, rather than federal,
authorities and therefore the industry is not sub-
ject to a single, consistent supervisory regime
across the nation. The Bureau of Labor Statistics
reports that about 136,000 people were employed
as “mortgage and non-mortgage loan brokers” in
May 2007, up from about 50,000 just ten years
ago. While the latest employment figure is down
somewhat from its recent peak in early 2006, the
sector’s cumulative employment growth during
recent years remains impressive (see Figure 1).
Mortgage brokers are especially important in
the non-prime sector. According to a private
research firm’s estimates, about 58 percent of all
recent residential mortgage loans involved a mort-
gage broker, up from about 40 percent a decade
ago.5 About 50 percent of prime mortgage trans-
actions involve a broker, but brokers originated
around 75 percent of subprime mortgages and
about 70 percent of Alt-A loans. Clearly, a non-
prime borrower is especially likely to deal with
a state-licensed and -supervised mortgage broker.
U.S. mortgage brokers are predominantly
small, local firms—precisely the type of entre-
preneurial firm that contributes mightily to all
segments of the U.S. economy. It is quite plausible
that these firms generally are more knowledge-
able than larger lenders about local markets and
borrowers and perhaps can be more responsive
and innovative. The employees of a local mort-
gage broker are likely to be long-time residents
with a stake in the community.
It is clear that a firm operating with little
capital investment enjoys some benefits. One
could mention the ease of opening up a new
business, of increasing or decreasing the scale of
operations, and of moving or closing down the
business. Operating under a regime of “light-
touch” supervision also keeps costs low and
enhances flexibility.
But the financial risk of operating with little
capital is that shocks to the operating environ-
ment—such as recent disruptions in secondary
markets for non-prime mortgages—quickly can
damage, if not destroy, the business. One of the
benefits of financial capital is that it can serve as
a “buffer stock” of patient funding that will help
a firm survive adverse developments in its market.
Clearly, many mortgage brokers are thinly capi-
talized firms that are facing difficult times now in
some markets and segments. Many have already
entered bankruptcy and others are likely to follow
given the scale of the current mortgage-market
downturn. Significant exit from a market sector
is not a problem as long as subsequent entry
remains relatively easy, as appears to be the case
in mortgage broking.
There is reason for concern about this busi-
ness model, however, when capital is so thin that
owners have little to lose if the business ceases
operations. If the owners have a significant finan-
cial investment in the business, and if this capital
cannot be withdrawn easily, then the key to prof-
itability is long-term survival in order to earn
returns year after year on the invested capital.
The owners always will keep one eye on the
immediate prospects for short-term profit and
the other eye on future profitability.
5 Simon and Hagerty (2007). The research firm whose estimates I cite is Wholesale Access, of Columbia, Maryland.
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6In the mortgage-banking business, a durable
stream of profits requires a continuing flow of
customers, both new and repeat business. The
business also requires a continuing flow of capital
from investors willing to buy the mortgages a
mortgage originator wants to sell and securitize.
Given the difficulty any mortgage broker likely
faces in differentiating its own products, how
can a broker stand out from the crowd to become
a long-term survivor? One way is to give outstand-
ing service to customers in the mortgage-shopping
process. Another way is to stand behind the work
the firm does and to be there when a previous
customer (or investor) has a question or complaint.
Turning these practices into future business
prospects, attracting both mortgage borrowers
and investors, is precisely the role for reputation.
Advertising may help get out a firm’s name,
but it is the firm’s good name and reputation
spread through word of mouth that pays the
highest dividends.6 As former Federal Reserve
Chairman Greenspan aptly put it, reputation can
be thought of as a valuable asset in its own right:
Trust as the necessary condition for commerce
was particularly evident in freewheeling
nineteenth-century America, where reputation
became a valued asset…In such an environ-
ment, a reputation for honest dealing, which
many feared was in short supply, was partic-
ularly valued. Even those inclined to be less
than scrupulous in their personal dealings had
to adhere to a more ethical standard in their
market transactions, or they risked being driven
out of business (Greenspan, 2005).
















Employees of Mortgage and Nonmortgage Loan Brokers
Not Seasonally Adjusted, Thousands of Employees
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics/Haver Analytics.
6 I do not mean to suggest that only mortgage brokers would benefit from greater investments in reputation and focus on the long term. Even
some large Wall Street firms active in underwriting, trading, and investing in non-prime mortgage-backed securities appear to have hesitated
in recent months when asked by some of their counterparties to prove that their reputations are of great value—to demonstrate the old adage
in financial markets, “My word is my bond.” Given that these firms have large capital investments and that they deal repeatedly with each
other, one would have thought that reputation would be sacrosanct.The non-prime mortgage business may not
be as freewheeling as nineteenth-century America,
but it has come in for its fair share of criticism
recently, to be sure. A reputation for honest deal-
ing surely would be an investment well worth
making by many of today’s market participants
that would pay dividends well into the future—
not just for the firms building their reputations,
but for all other market participants, as well.
Realtors also have an important responsibil-
ity in the mortgage market. From happy experi-
ence over the years, I myself know how valuable
a realtor can be in providing advice and informa-
tion on neighborhoods, their schools, quirks of
local government and everything else a home-
owner should discover before making a commit-
ment to buy a particular house. Realtors can help
potential mortgage borrowers shop for mortgages
and select mortgage terms appropriate for the
individual circumstances of each borrower.
THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND
THE NON-PRIME MORTGAGE
MARKET
The Federal Reserve had followed develop-
ments in housing and the non-prime mortgage
markets very closely this year (Bernanke, 2007a,
2007b, 2007c). A highly visible development is
the growing amount of financial stress among
some of the millions of households with non-
prime mortgages. We know that many non-prime
mortgage lenders and brokers have gone out of
business or tightened their lending standards this
year, reducing the flow of mortgage credit to bor-
rowers unable to access the prime market. Finan-
cial markets have dealt harshly, but on the whole
appropriately, with banks, hedge funds and cer-
tain other investors who were heavily exposed
to the riskiest segments of the non-prime securi-
tized mortgage market.
While none of these developments is pleasant
for the lenders and financial firms most directly
affected, one cannot help being impressed with
the even-handedness of it all. Until we receive
clear evidence that basically sound financial
decisions and arrangements were disrupted by
erratic and irrational market forces, I believe we
should conclude that this year’s markets punished
mostly bad actors and/or poor lending practices.
Lenders who made loans to borrowers without
documentation, or who did not check borrower
documents that proved fraudulent, or who made
adjustable-rate loans to borrowers who could not
hope to service the debt when rates adjusted up,
deserved financial failure. As is often the case,
the market’s punishment of unsound financial
arrangements has been swift, harsh and without
prejudice. While I cannot feel sorry for the
lenders who have gone out of business, my atti-
tude is entirely different toward the relatively
unsophisticated, but honest, borrowers who
have lost their homes through foreclosure. Many
are true victims.
Like other observers, we have noted with
great concern the increasing delinquency and
foreclosure rates on certain non-prime loan cate-
gories during 2006 and 2007. Because Congress
has assigned to the Federal Reserve and to the
Federal Trade Commission the primary respon-
sibility of interpreting and implementing several
important consumer-protection statutes, we
have been undertaking a number of consumer-
protection initiatives and actions.7 We have been
working on revising required credit-card disclo-
sures for several years and, beginning in 2006, we
have turned our attention increasingly to non-
prime-mortgage issues. I will list briefly some of
the more important recent Federal Reserve con-
sumer-protection initiatives related to non-prime
mortgages:8
7 Most notably, the Federal Reserve is responsible for implementing the Truth in Lending Act (TILA, implemented as Regulation Z) and for
defining unfair and deceptive acts and practices under and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA, implemented as Regulation C) and
its key amendments, the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and under the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act).
The Fed’s enforcement authority, however, is limited to the financial institutions the Federal Reserve supervises directly.
8 For more details, see Chairman Bernanke’s Congressional testimony (Bernanke, 2007a).
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8• In coordination with the other federal
supervisory agencies, we are encouraging
the financial industry to work with borrow-
ers to arrange prudent loan modifications
to avoid unnecessary foreclosures.
• Federal Reserve banks around the country
are cooperating with community and
industry groups that work directly with
borrowers having trouble meeting their
mortgage obligations.
• We are working with organizations that
provide counseling about mortgage prod-
ucts to current and potential homeowners.
• We are meeting with market participants—
including lenders, investors, servicers and
community groups—to discuss their con-
cerns and to gain information about market
developments.
• We are conducting a top-to-bottom review
of possible actions we might take to help
prevent recurrence of recent problems,
including more-effective disclosures to
help consumers defend against improper
lending.
• We held five public hearings across the
country during 2006 and 2007, during
which we gathered information on the
adequacy of disclosures for mortgages, par-
ticularly for nontraditional and adjustable-
rate products (see Kroszner, 2007, for more
information).
• By the end of the year, we will propose
changes to TILA rules to address concerns
about mortgage loan advertisements and
solicitations that may be incomplete or
misleading and to require lenders to pro-
vide mortgage disclosures more quickly so
that consumers can get the information
they need when it is most useful to them.
• We have improved a disclosure that credi-
tors must provide to every applicant for an
adjustable-rate mortgage product to explain
better the features and risks of these prod-
ucts, such as “payment shock” and rising
loan balances.
• We plan to exercise our authority under the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act (HOEPA) to address specific practices
that are unfair or deceptive, including but
not limited to pre-payment penalties, the
use of escrow accounts for taxes and insur-
ance,stated-incomeandlow-documentation
lending, and the evaluation of a borrower’s
ability to repay.
• In coordination with the other federal
supervisory agencies, in 2006, the Fed
issued principles-based guidance on non-
traditional mortgages, and, in June of 2007,
the Fed issued supervisory guidance on
subprime lending.
• We reviewed our policies related to the
examination of non-bank subsidiaries of
bank and financial holding companies for
compliance with consumer protection laws
and guidance.
• As a result of that review and following
discussions with the Office of Thrift
Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission
and state regulators, as represented by the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors and
the American Association of Residential
Mortgage Regulators, we are launching a
cooperativepilotprojectaimedatexpanding
consumer protection compliance reviews
at selected non-depository lenders with
significant subprime mortgage operations.
Based on these activities, I think you will
agree that the Federal Reserve takes its consumer-
protection responsibilities in the area of non-
prime mortgage lending very seriously.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Every mortgage foreclosure is a tragedy for
the borrower, except perhaps those where the
borrower participated in a fraud. Yet this obser-
vation does not by itself suggest what can or
should be done to improve the functioning of
the mortgage market. Based on my observation
of financial markets, institutions and regulation
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search for ways to strengthen borrower protections
without so increasing regulatory costs and risks
to lenders that they withdraw from the non-prime
market. When we consider regulations designed
to address abusive lending practices, we need to
understand their possible impact on responsible
lenders. We will not be helping potential borrow-
ers if we eliminate abuses by imposing regulations
that have the unintended effect of eliminating
the entire subprime market. My comment is not
a counsel of despair, but a counsel of caution.
Regulators need to be creative and not necessarily
inactive.
We need to emphasize individual responsi-
bility and accountability in every corner of the
market. Lenders and brokers who put naive bor-
rowers into unsuitable mortgages, which later go
into default, deserve the losses they suffer. But
these lenders and brokers also lose a long-term
business opportunity. A successful borrower,
who is able to stay current on a subprime mort-
gage, can expect to become a prime borrower in
time. Every mortgage lender or broker should
want that borrower to become a repeat customer.
Regulators should do what they can to help
educate borrowers and encourage improvements
of incentives and business practices. If any of
you believe there are ways the Federal Reserve
can help in providing information, I hope you
will call on us so we can be partners in this
endeavor.
Thank you, and I’d be delighted to take your
questions.
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Classifying the Non-Prime Mortgage Market
There are several conceptually distinct approaches to classifying the various segments of the resi-
dential mortgage market. The sector classifications sometimes overlap each other, and sometimes they
create anomalies of various sorts. This appendix provides a brief introduction to some of the classifica-
tion schemes used in the mortgage market.
Conventional vs. Non-Conventional. One way to split the market is to distinguish between
government-insured or -guaranteed mortgages and the private, or “conventional” sector. The govern-
ment (non-conventional) sector comprises mortgages made by private lenders but backed by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) or the Veterans Administration (VA). Government-guaranteed mort-
gages constitute only about 10 percent of the total market today.9
Conforming vs. Non-Conforming. Another way to split the mortgage market is to distinguish
between mortgages eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac—so-called “conforming”
mortgages—and all others (“non-conforming”). The conforming share of the market is perhaps 70
percent in the sense that this fraction of borrowing households could qualify for a mortgage eligible
for purchase by Fannie or Freddie if they chose to submit such an application. The actual purchases
made by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were just over 50 percent of the total market earlier this decade
and now are below half. In addition, some conforming mortgages are held by the loan originators or
sold to others without the intermediation of Fannie or Freddie.
The conforming market is entirely conventional and prime, but there are conventional and prime
mortgages that are not conforming. The non-conforming sector includes “jumbo” mortgages—those
larger than the upper limit placed by law on Fannie and Freddie purchases—and others that fail to meet
Fannie and Freddie underwriting guidelines for one reason or another. The subprime, Alt-A and jumbo
sectors emerged from the conventional, non-conforming part of the mortgage market.
Subprime Mortgage Lenders vs. Prime Lenders. A third mortgage classification scheme is espe-
cially important for understanding the subprime sector and federal consumer-protection efforts in this
area. The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) deems all mortgage loans
subprime that are made by a lending institution engaged primarily in that business line.10 While not
ideal from an analytical perspective because it lumps together some dissimilar mortgages and borrow-
ers simply because they have a common originator, the HUD classification scheme is extremely impor-
tant in practical terms.11 This classification convention is followed both for Home Mortgage Disclosure
Act (HMDA) reporting purposes and by the Mortgage Bankers Association when compiling its widely
used mortgage-originations and -delinquency surveys.
Subprime Mortgage Products and Practices vs. Prime Products and Practices. A fourth approach
to determining what the non-prime market is could be termed a product- and practices-based approach.
Some consumer advocates have argued that certain mortgage features, product types or underwriting
practices are targeted to vulnerable populations, such as minorities, women, households with irregular
incomes and others. These advocates argue that some features, products and practices—such as pre-
Reputation and the Non-Prime Mortgage Market
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9 For more information on government mortgage programs, see Quigley (2006).
10 For details of HUD’s methodology and a list of subprime lenders, see the HUD website, http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html.
11 For more information on HMDA and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act amendments to HMDA, see
http://stlouisfed.org/hmdaregcamendments/default.html.payment penalties, hybrid ARMs with introductory teaser rates, underwriting without regard to long-
run mortgage affordability and yield-spread premiums paid to brokers by lenders—are deceptive and
abusive in their own rights. In other words, the advocates argue that these features, products and prac-
tices should be considered per se subprime—if not predatory—and deserving of greater oversight. In
this view, some borrowers who could have qualified for a prime mortgage end up with more-expensive
subprime or Alt-A loans because they are part of a group that is targeted to receive a non-prime mortgage.
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